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INTRODUCTION.
The purpose of this thesis is to discover and evaluate
Edward Scribner Ames's concept of God. I have selected Ames
because he is a pragmatist, and through the study of his
philosophy I hope to determine more clearly the attitude
of pragmatism toward the concept of God. To determine this
is important, as pragmatism is one of the most influential
of modern philosophies. Every thoughtful person will desire
to understand the manner in which pragmatism deals with
life's important problems in order that he may determine
his attitude toward pragmatism. As Ames is an outstanding
representative of the religious elements in pragmatism one
may well choose his philosophy for examination.
From the time of the appearance of magazine articles
in the year 1906 through the period of his Religion
,
published
in 1929, Ames has consistently held certain attitudes and ideas
concerning God. During this period there has been no marked
change in his concept of God, or in his attitude toward trie
God concept. Elements which he stresses at one period are
consistent with the elements whicn he stresses at any other
time. In his "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional
Psychology," American Journal of Theology, 10(1906), 219-232,
Ames shows his opinion that religion should be studied from
the psychological view. This psychological interest continues
to be a large factor in the philosophy of Ames. In his article,
"The Validity of tne Idea of God," Journal of Religion , 1(1921),
462-481, he approaches the problem of the validity of tne idea
of God, as he says, from the social and genetic points of
view. He here points out two other factors which are seldom
absent from his method, whether early or late. He considers
•
validity in terms of value and experience, rather tnan in
terms of the metaphysical concept of existence. Hov/ever,
there is evidence of much psychological interest in the problem.
Herbert W\ Schneider points out that the exposition of
the religion set forth in Ames's Religion is couched in the
now familiar terms of tne psychology of religion. Religion
,
says Schneider, "brings together the general implications of
the psychology of religion begun by William James in his
Varieties of Religious Experience . Ames studies religion in
terms of the conscious content of religious experience. His
chief concern is with the relations between religion, philosophy,
and science. In addition to the psychological interest in
Religion , the book has a 1 decided social and moral interest.
Ames has synthesized James's and Dewey's psychologies and
constructed them into a religion. Yet on the whole, says
Schneider, the approach of Ames to religion is psychological,
rather than social or antnropological . Religion must be
appreciated in terms of the aims and methods of the psychology
of religion. (l)
Although from the time of his earliest writings until
the present Ames has approached religion as a psychologist,
his philosophical interest has gradually increased in later
years. From 1906, the date of his "Theology from tne Standpoint
of Functional Paychology, " until 1918 he may be described as
a psychologist greatly interested in religion. From the
date of his book, The New Orthodoxy
,
1918, until the present
he may be described as a philosopher who believes that many
of our problems are to be solved through psychology. His
The Psychology of Religious Experience, 191Q, is a psychology.
His other primary books, The New Orthodoxy and Religion , 1929,

are rather philosophies.
In setting forth the concept of God held by Ames, and
his attitude toward the various matters dealt witn in tnis
paper, I will first give his tnoughts and attitudes upon tne
matters under discussion. Then I will give my own comments,
where tnis seems advisable. My comments will be distinguished
from thoughts taken from another source in that I will always
indicate the source of such other material. Any material not
followed by such a note is my own. In general I will reserve
my own comments until tne end of tne division or subdivision
and will place them in separate paragraphs.
<
I. AMES'S ATTITUDE TOWARD RELIGION.
A. Science and Religion.
Empirical science, with all its conorts, such as
historical method, study of the social nature of man, the
theory of evolution, and functional or behavioristic psychology,
has demonstrated the lack of foundation for belief in the
traditional religion or God. The empirical array has put
to rout any possible conclusive proof of God in the historical
sense of the word. The metaphysical, abstract, pure realms
of absolutes and infinites are all speculation in comparison
with the comparative certainties of the empirical. Instead
of from divine fiat religion and other social processes spring
from human needs. Yet this need not destroy interest in
religion. Instead a greater interest may develop in a
religion conscious of its limitations, but using science and
practical experimentation to improve itself. (2) However,
there are many scientifically trained people, specialized
in analysis and in a limited kind of laboratory accounting,
who refuse to acknowledge anything which does not fall within
their method and vision as valuable or significant. They
are blind when it comes to religion, neither feeling religious,
nor sensing tne importance, and perhaps not the reality, of
religious experience. The unreligious cannot appreciate
religion. (3)
Ames here fails to recognize that empirical science may
help to prove God by pointing out the "mind-wise" construction
of the universe. In addition see pages 16 and 18.
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B. Empiricism.
Ames is empirical in his religion. He "believes that
through modern psychology and the development of a science
of morals religion may gain a vital and appealing insight
into the natural spiritual life. Psychology reveals man as
a creature of impulses, desires, wishes, cravings. He is
aware of needs and wants, and able to discriminate among
different forms of satisfaction in their fulfilment. The
modes of conduct most fully satisfying his needs and leading
on to enlarging desires and satisfactions are found to "be
"best. The good consists in fulfilling the needs of trie
individual and of society. The supreme good is the develop-
ment of personality in terms of enligntened and socialized
character. It must reckon with the conditions and relations
within which sucn cnaracter is alone possible. A religion
of experience offers a salvation worked out witn intelligent
participation in concrete, aspiring, numan tasks, fused in an
organic social whole. Courage, wisdom, temperance, industry,
sympathy, honesty, justice, are good because wnen fused to-
gether in the active conduct of a thoughtful and expanding
character they are conducive to satisfying experience. (4)
There is no division between the spiritual life and tne practical
and intelligible life. (5) The solution of theological and
religious problems seems to be by means of functional psy-
chology. (6)
As in science, so in religion, we must observe the facts,
the processes in growth, the development, if we are to under-
stand and control our subject. Wotning must come between tne
searcher and tne facts. "Ye snail know the truth, and tne
trutn snail raaxe you free." Jesus based nis teachings upon
t
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experience, upon facts that he daily observed. The authority
for Jesus' teaching may be found and verified in experience
by anyone. The great parables came straight out of life.
We must look to life for its meaning and direction. (7)
One of the most significant forv/ard steps in our society is
the fact that we have begun to find out now to create the
normal and natural conditions out of which tne highest moral
qualities can most successfully be produced. We find by
observation that the Christian conception of love is spontaneous
in life itself. Likewise religious faith is only the forward-
striving, hopeful, expectant, willing to ta±ce some risK,
attitude, found in every great field of nurnan activity.
Moreover, these attitudes are largely dependent upon social
and physical conditions, such as labor and health conditions.
Education is a factor in the spiritual life. Thus the religion
of Jesus is the religion of life at its best. Its attitudes
are reverence for life and for the moral distinctions which
commenj themselves to the experience of tne race, love for
our fellow-men, and tne forward moving action of life in the
quest for better things. (8) Jesus was willing to rest tne
justification of his religion upon experience, letting it be
tested by its fruits. He encouraged it tc expand beyond
anything ne had said or done. (9)
I will now give three illustrations of tne way in which
Ames's empiricism leads him to deal with some of the definite
problems of religion.
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1. The Soul.
Scientifically mind is more and more being regarded as
the behavior of some organisms, especially of human beings.
Mind is the functioning of the organism, a biological response
to stimuli, a physical matter. (10) The status of spirit
and its relation to body is doubtful. The extremes are
reaction of organism on tne one nand and on the other a
separate entity which may pass in and out of tne body, being
separate metaphysically from trie body. Tne former extreme
seems to be nearer the trutn tnan the latter. "Crganism-
displaying-raental-abili ty" seems to be the truest name we
can give to tne facts as ire can determine them. (ll) At
present the term "self" is more common than "soul" or "spirit."
'Thatever we call this element, it is tne mind as it Knows
itself. The use of "I," "me," or one's name, designates tne
self of the individual in question. Description of one's
own personality is peculiarly difficult, but the sense of it
is most intimate and vital. The self involves self-identi ty
and time transcendence. Our self is the being we experience
ourself to be. A man knows himself immediately: he is at home
with nis thougnts and feelings. He may undergo sudden and
extreme cnanges and yet retain tne feeling of bein^ tne same
person. The cnanges are as real as the sameness. One ijiows
his own self best in nis ov/n experience. He knows what it
is to nave experience. (12) Since it admits consciousness
the last part of this paragraph opposes radical metaphysical
behaviorism, which otherwise seems to taint the first part of
the paragraph.
•
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2. Religion Is the Search for Practical Values.
An empirical, realistic interpretation of religion takes
its historical forms for what they are, estimating tneir
worth in terms of the values which they cherish and tne ends
they serve. (13) Religion is not so much a theory as a
way of living. It is a body of attitudes rather than a set
of ideas, a system of values more than a deposit of symbols
and ordinances. (14) We should adopt the practical attitude
of measuring religion by its contribution to the character
and well-being of those wno cherish it. Tne standards of
truth and value should be placed within experience. Free
experiment is essential to the greatest religious progress.
(15) We should think of ourselves as perfectly free souls,
unawed by authority or superstition, yet reverent toward the
things which experience has taught us and eagerly in quest
of clearer perceptions of the ideal possibilities of life.
The attitudes of the Christian religion, as of ail the best
religions, are those toward life as it naturally unfolds in
simple human relations, those involved in our social complexes,
those which relate to our efforts to contribute to tne fulness
and beauty of tne life of the world. Tnese are the attitudes
of reverence, love, faith. (16)
Religion has an eye to practical values. It tries to
help men out of their difficulties and smooth over tne rough
places in life. It tries to lend a helping, hand at the tension
points of the life-cycle of tne individual. It has its
ceremonies for the emergency points in the food securing
process. It has its rites for events of intercourse among
peoples. Many people are religious for their own advantage,
for security, prosperity, and to create a claim on the universe
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for these values. This does not necessarily mean that "being
religious secures the desired values. People are religious
"because they w^nt something, and being religious is tneir
way of striving for what they want. The religious attitude
is that of hoping, wishing, expecting, demanding. (17)
Theology is essentially the systematic rationalization
of customs and of the fragmentary, uncriticized ideas carried
along in the practice of religion. (18) The test of the
truth, not only of science, but also of metaphysics and
theology, is the success with wnicn they aid tne life processes
(19)
Ames's book, Religion
,
may throw the friend of "the
faith of our fathers'' into a melancholic mental condition.
It is materialistic and mechanistic in the sense of basing the
universe upon the elements and processes discovered by the
natural sciences instead of upon the will and power of a
personal God. It regards God as a human ideal, existing in
the minds of believers. It is empirical, for it would regard
religion as a natural process, and would discover the nature
and needs of religion by empirical search into all its elements
including the psychological and social elements. Yet it is
idealistic in that it 3ets up the highest social and individual
welfare as the end toward which religion should aim. It sees
life in terras of consciousness and values, rather than in
terms of biological organisms. It finds the highest good in
the discriminating enlargement and satisfaction of human
values. The purpose of religion, it believes, is to nelp in
accomplishing this end.
This book recognizes that religion is far behind other
elements of our civilization. It insists that religion should
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accommodate itself to the flowing stream of civilization, for
only thus can it live and serve. It weighs our past and present
religion in the balances, finds it wanting, sees its destruction
if it does not remedy the fault, but points out the way of
prosperity and service for religion in service to modern life
by modern metnods. For Ames there is no fundamental distinction
between the religious life and the thoughtfully good life.
3. Freudianism and Religion.
Freudianisra interprets the religious sense of trust and
intimacy as due to the child-father complex derived from tne
close relation of parent and child. Some tnink this discredits
man's idea of the fatnerhood of God, simply because it is
traced to such an origin. But, on the contrary, tais Freudian
doctrine may well illuminate tne natural processes by which
religious sentiments develop. These intelligent explanations
of its attitudes may give religion more concreteness and appeal.
We may find here serviceable means for the more certain develop-
ment of desirable emotional responses to justifiable religious
values. To explain religious experience is not to explain it
away, but many naively assume that by explanation religion is
invalidated. Instead of invalidating religion explanation gives
us the possibility of a valid interpretation of it in terms of
human experience, if we can find the patterns of religious
values and behavior in tne most intimate and impressive
relations of the family and kinship groups. (20)

13.
C. The Problem of Evil.
Good and evil are not metaphysical, transcendental realities,
but rather concrete, particular conditions of experience incident
to an active, moving, evaluating interest. Good and evil are
adjectives, not substantives. They describe tne qualities of
experience and have no independent subsistence in tneir own rignt.
A thing is evil if it opposes the issues of plans and efforts.
That is good which upbuilds. That which weakens and undermines
is bad. A thing is bad or good in proportion as it hinders and
mars or enhances the larger life-process and conduct. Evils exist
only in opposition to plans and endeavors. Evil and good exist
only in relation to desired objectives. Taken by themselves
physical things are neither good nor bad, and tne same is true of
mere intentions. Only ideas developing into acts and deeds pulsing
with thought are good or bad. In short, good and evil exist only
as helps or hindrances in the fulfilling of values. (21) In
addition see pages 53, 27-29, 36-37,. 39, 43.
We have found Ames's attitude toward religion distinctly
empirical and pragmatic. He regards religion as some tiling
natural, of the earth, to be dealt with as we would deal with
any other phenomena. Religion is for him only justified and
true in as much as it satisfies human needs and fulfills
values. He mentions the attitude of Jesus in support of his
position. I believe that this attitude toward religion is much
more fruitful than the attitude which regarded religion as a
supernatural system of divine dogma, far from the practical
affairs of earth. Too much of our religion has been of tnis
fruitless supernatural and dogmatic type, forgetting tne needs
and even the values of humanity. At the end of tnis study I
will consider the adequacy of pragmatism.
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II. AMES'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GOD CONCEPT.
A. God Cannot Be Conclusively Proved.
By his rational is tic method Descartes set up a dualism
of the first person's soul on one side and all the world of
objects, other persons and God on the other side. Upon this
question there has arisen a prolonged warfare, the idealists
on one side trying to explain the material realities by means
of soul or spirit, and on the otner side the materialists
trying to ignore or explain spiritual phenomena on the basis
of matter. Some dualists allow the existence of both elements,
but are not able to solve the epis temological question of
knowledge relation between mind and object.
The materialists could disregard tne problem of God as
they did that of soul. But tne idealists have valiantly
endeavored to prove the existence of God. Kant held that
reason could never forego the que^t, but could never solve
the question. He concluded that the great arguments for the
existence of God, the t eleological
,
cosraological , and the
ontological, will continue to be used, but will always end in
disappointment. There is as much to be said by strict
reasoning against as for the existence of God. Dispairing of
reason as prover of God men have fled to mysticism, have felt
that they have experienced God, but have not been able to
show this logically, or explain it. Many have adopted
scientific empirical method in everything but in answering
the riddle of the uxistence of God. Here tney refuee to
use scientific empiricism. Those using empiricism should
carry it through the whole realm of religious thinking.
( 22)
The philosophical empiricism of John Stuart Mill showed
the fallacy of the traditional theological conception of God

prove. David Hume's religious skepticism also did much to
destroy the credit given to proofs of God's existence. It
involves such conclusions as the following: There is no
conclusive evidence for the existence of God on the basis
of the design argument. Nature is not clearly a completely
ordered system, "but shows imperfections. Pain and evil give
grounds for doubting that creation is tne work of an all-
powerful and beneficent creator. The world mignt be the worK
of a limited deity, or of an inexperienced, young, or super-
annuated deity, or possibly tne world is self -generating by a
vegetative or animal process. All this removes the foundation
af any decisive proof of a God as the creator and sustainer
of the world. ( 23) Laplace, a scientist of rank, said,
"I have swept the neavens with my telescope, and find no God
there." ( 24)
The excessive dignity associated with religious ceremonial
and the deity have contributed to tne impression that religion
is derived from a su£jernatural source and divinely revealed
to man. (25)
No one has ever adequately answered the question as to
whether or not a supreme, absolutely perfect being exists.
Te can not prove or disprove tne objective existence of an
actual reality corresponding to tne subjective idea of God.
TVe are unable to get outside of experience to investigate
the assertion that sometning exists tnere. God is a regulative
conception, justified by tne practical way in which it serves
to unify and guide experience, as Kant declared. This does
not mean that the idea of God is false and meaningless. It
does set up value as the criterion of truth. If the idea of
God serves to organize the highest interests of life, if it
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vitalizes them with dynamic power in eliciting and controlling
efficient reactions of the will, it is true. Otherwise it is
irrelevant, and untrue. The conception of God is truest which
aids most in guiding, ennobling, comforting, £.nd strengthening
man in his devotion to moral ends. Such an idea of God is the
working hypothesis of religion, is in harmony with science, and
finds confirmations in the teachings of tfesus. Both religious
creeds and organizations had their rise in great practical
issues, and these forms change to meet changing needs. In so
far as they are meeting needs they are self sustaining, but only
by authority or force are they upheld when they become false.
Recognition of this relativity of truth, adoption of the
scientific spirit and method, is the hope of salvation for
religion. ( 26
)
In taking Laplace f s inability to find God with the
telescope as an indication that God's existence could not be
proved, Ames falls into the fallacy of trying to use instruments
in no way fitted for the task. The methods of the empirical
sciences can not prove the existence of God, for these methods
can only deal with empirical pnysical objects and their relations.
God does not come within tnis category. We cannot find even
the consciousness of other human beings by empirical methods,
but there are few things of which we are more certain. God is
of the the- category of consciousness, and we must use methods
in accord with this fact if we are to find him.
Ames largely frees himself from this fallacy by his
argument for God on the basis of human values. However, as
I have set forth Ames's value argnment it is as early as 1906,
while the other arguments which I have presented are much
later. Nevertheless, Ames's system seems to be a consistent
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whole, the expression of any one date being in harmony with
Ames's thought at any other date. The essential difficulty
with this value proof of the existence of God is that it does
not prove God's existence. If we discover that the idea of
God serves to organize the highest interests of life, i*f it
vitalizes them with dynamic power in eliciting and controlling
efficient reactions of the will, just so much is proved, and
no more. Proof of this proves this, but it does not prove
the existence of God, which is a different matter. The very
nature of Ames's God causes him to fall into this fallacy.
His God, as we shall see, is a concept, and not an object
outside of human consciousness. Even if we grant that the
pragmatic method, for such Ames's method is, proves the
existence of the concept of God, and proves that that concept
works, we have not found the proof of God. We have only
proven the existence of a fruitful concept, which is not the
same thing as proving that the concept is a valid representation
of an objective reality external to the concept and to the
human mind having the concept. The thought, or concept, that
one's grandmother is to make a visit at one's home may cause
the grandchild much pleasure, may bring about good actions
when bad are the rule, may wholly transform the child for the
better, because the child wants to please grandmo the r . Yet
grandmother may have recently died, and instead of her making
a. trip to the child's home, the child may never see her again.
The concept has good results, it is fruitful in the very best
sense. Cuch an idea may even serve to organize the highest
interests of life, it may vitalize them with dynamic power in
eliciting efficient reactions of the will, but as an attempted
proof of the truth of grandmother's visit it is false. It
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does not even prove grandmother's existence, to say nothing of
its proving that grandmother will make the desired visit.
The child may never have seen grandmother, hut may have built
up a complicated conception of her from what others have told
him. Ames's attempt to prove God's existence by pointing out
that God is valuable amounts to nothing more than a proof that
it is a good thing for us to have a concept of God, for such
a concept leads to worthy and valuable living. Yet we must not
forget that Ames is right in trying to find proof of God in the
realm of consciousness , rather than in the realm of the physical
sciences. But even the physical sciences may furnish indications
of God's existence, but never a proof of his existence. Physical
science shows that the universe runs in accordance with definite,
consistent, and cohering rules, at least for the most part
in a rational way, quite in accord with human intelligence.
If one is not by nature a positivist this leads to the conclusion
that there must be a reasonable power back of the reasonable
actions of the universe. For those metaphysically inclined
this reasonable power may seem to be God. In such a manner
physical science "indicates" that there is a God. But this
"indication" is not proof. The positivist may, as far as logic
is concerned, be right when he insists that we only see the
reasonable actions of the universe, and in no way do we see
God; Therefore we have no right to posit God. On the other
hand proof of God requires that we show such reasons for his
existence that every rational mind must accept them. Proof
must show that we can have no coherent thought of the universe
without him, that God must exist in order not to contradict
known realities, and must refute every argument against his
existence
.

B. Empirical Study of tne God Concept.
Only through empirical study of it can we understand
the God concept. The empirical study of tne God concept
attempts to review tne experience of men in actual use of God
instead of trying to proceed in terms of abstract reason to
determine tne nature and meaning of God. The theory of
duality of mind and object made God either a product of tne
mind only, or else an exterior object whicn tne mind could
not know in any positive manner. Kant and prevailing schools
of theology since nis time held that it might be that God
existed outside the range of definite knowledge. The empirical
study first goes back to the problem of existence and inquires
concerning the nature of God. It seeks to discover the nature
of God by reviewing the history of religion and racial cultures.
It tnus finds that tne gods of all religions are the life-
process itself, idealized and personified. Gods bear the
marks of the habits and moral character of their worshippers.
When his people change profoundly he changes in tne same way.
Be they militant or peaceful, a monarchy or democracy, etc.,
he keeps step with them. YThen men are divided into many
groups there are many gods. ''/hen men are more unified they
tend to have a god or gods in common, or to allow or favor
each^bther's gods. As humanity approacnes unity God becomes
more and more the God of the whole universe, material and
spiritual. He is thought of as trie soul of social values,
the embodiment of ideals, the reality of the good and tne
beautiful, the meaning of tne world. Thus we solve the
problem of God's existence. His reality is given in the
living experience of all socially minded people. The reality
of God is the same as that of a people, being perhaps greater,
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but of this kind. As an illustration we may notice the
reality of one's Alma Mater and of Uncle Sam, entities
having a "being and reality above any individual belonging
to them. (27)
Religion and religious institutions spring from the
impulses and desires of men. One of the main tasks of the
psychology and the history of religion is to discover how
this may be. For this task a genetic study is required.
We must take account of the total genius, concrete history,
and complex environment of the people in trying to understand
their religion. (28) The meaning of God may best be discovered
through the history of religion and social psychology. (29)
We have seen that Ames accuses tne theory of the duality
of mind and object of making God either a product of tne mind
only, or else an exterior object which tne mind could not
know in any positive manner. Before pointing out how Ames
himself falls into the fallacy of making God a product of mind
it will be well to point out that ne over estimates the force
of the dilemma he nas called attention to in his argument. If
God is only a product of mind, and of nurnan mind, then that is
a serious objection, but if he is an exterior object no great
difficulty follows. All that is except our subjective self is
exterior to us. The material world is composed of exterior
objects, which, logically, should be much more difficult for us
to know than it should be for us to know a personal God. A
personal God is of kindred nature with our personality, but material
t
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objects are of an entirely different substance and realm.
How can there be any relationship between materialless conscious-
ness, or selves, and material objects? Yet not only do we base
our lives upon the assumption that such relationship is possible,
but the difficulty does not seem to trouble Ames in the least.
To doubt that we can know exterior objects in so complete and
satisfactory manner that we may base our lives on this assumption
is to fall into skepticism. Skepticism is self refuting, at
least on the basis of pragmatism, which Ames represents. The
skeptic says that we can know nothing, but this means that he
cannot know that we cannot know, for if he knows that we cannot
know he at least knows that we cannot know, and at once he has
demonstrated that we can know. Moreover, to take scepticism
seriously would mean that it would be useless to plant crops,
build homes, or do any of life's tasks, for we know not what
the morrow will bring or whether our tasks will bear fruit.
If epis temological dualism is as objectionable as Ames pretends,
resulting in inability to know the external, then Ames should
conclude that it is useless for him to expound at length about
his theory of God, for he can neither prove nor know that
there is any other being in the world to hear or read his
words. In making the cosmic system his God Ames decidedly
accepts epis temological dualism and at the same time denies that
it is any serious barrier to knowledge. If we can know material
objects so thoroughly that we can live our three score and ten
very successfully on the basis that we do know the external,
surely we could much more know that wnich is not foreign
substance, but kin in substance to our selves, personality,
which is the nature of a personal God. Thus Ames's argument
falls to the ground. It is as disasterous for Ames as for
anyone else, but life itself disproves it for all.
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Ames says that God includes men, the social process,
and the material world. In consideration of his empirical
position Ames cannot consistently say that there is any
personality back of the material world, for such an assertion,
empiricism holdB, cannot be empirically proved. The personality
of the social process, as far as empiricism is concerned, is
limited to the personalities of the individual human beings
within the social process. If Ames is consistent he must
admit that empirically God is not discoverable in any one of
the elements which he has listed as composing God. As an
empiricist Ames can find no element in the whole which was
not in the parts. Immediately when he says that the sum of
men, social process and material world has a personality
which the parts did not possess he is inconsistent with his
empiricism, for no such quality is evident in the universe
except in individuals. Ames takes elements, which taken
alone on the basis of his empiricism are not God, adds them
up, and calls the total God. Since some of the elements are
personal he says the total is personal. This is no more true
than it is to say that a large white population is a negro
population because it has a few negroes in it. If God is
anything he has an existence, an entity, of his own, and he
cannot be constructed out of elements which are not God.
If Ames said that the particulars were products, or thought
processes, of a personal individual I would find no objection.
But he proceeds the other way. He has no unity or supreme
personal individual to start %ith, but rather he adds up
a group of elements and attributes unity, individuality,
and personality to the whole, calling it God. In attributing
personality to the whole he makes the mistake of attributing
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to the whole qualities of the parts which are not empirically
discoverable in the whole. As will become evident in the
course of this study he not only calls this whole God, but
feels that it is so constructed that it helps to accomplish
individual values. Thus he feels that it is friendly and
on this ground builds up an affection for it. V/e have seen
that Ames accuses the theory of duality of mind and object,
of making God either an unknowable object exterior to the
mind or only a product of mind. I have already pointed out
the fallacy of Ames *s accusation that the theory of duality
may make God an unknowable object exterior to mind. Now it
seems evident that Ames himself falls before the other horn
of the dilemma. He has constructed his God without adequate
empirical data, nor does he offer any theory which permits
him so to proceed. Empirically the external reality is no
such personal being as Ames feels his God to be. As an
illustration of the fallacy Ames falls into it will be well
to consider one of the qualities which he includes in his
"universe God.
Ames feels that the universe, among other personal
characteristics, is friendly. As an empiricist he has no
basis for such a feeling. A rock may be ever so useful in
helping to keep him warm when placed in the wall of his house,
but that rock has not the slightest feeling of friendship for
anyone or anything. An empiricist can find no element of
friendship or personality in a rock. In this same way the
universe as a whole is not friendly as far as we can empirically
discover, but only useful. As far as we can empirically
discover the universe as a whole has no personal character-
istics. It is neither friendly nor unfriendly. Empirically
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the only personality within the universe is the concrete
personalities of the particular individual personalities
within the universe. Furthermore, the social process is not
personal. There is no such entity as the social process
which has consciousness. Different individuals having
consciousness so act and speak and think as to bring about
other types of acts, words, and thougnts, and this change we
call the social process, but as a concrete particular entity
it does not exist. Thus it can not be personal. Each
individual can be conscious, but empirically no consciousness
is discoverable in the vhole apart from the parts. Ames
himself says:
"It seems scarcely necessary to add that this emphasis
upon the social character of religion does not mean
that it is not an experience of individuals. All
social life is of course an affair of individuals.
Society, 1 abstracted from individuals, or conceived
in some overhead manner, is non-existent . " (30)
Thus in attributing to the whole elements not empirically
discoverable in the whole as a whole Ames makes his God
only a construction of the mind, having no objective
existence on the basis of Ames's empirical and positivistic
philosophy.
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C, Evolution of the God Concept.
Among the Hebrews and Greeks the concept of God advanced
from animal to human god and from local to universal god.
In this last stage God is tnought of as over all and upholding
the universe. Beginning vvitn Descartes modern metaphysics
has undertaken to deal witn tnis idea of God as an independent
object. William Robertson Smith aas shown that originally the
Hebrew gods were totemic gods, and only after generations of
prophets had labored to establish gods of numan characteristics
v/as religion so purified. When the life of tne people depended
largely upon animals they represented their gods as animals.
'.Then the existence of the people depended more largely upon
human leadership and accomplishment they began to Humanize
their gods. The same process took place among tne GreeKS,
according to Gilbert Murray. (31)
Science has made fruitful investigations in religious
phenomena, showing in part the elements involved in conduct and
belief. Science has revealed mucn concerning belief in God
and in immortality. It has shown that tnese beliefs are
related to the education and social status of tne respondents.
(32 ) Religion is a social process. In studying it we need
to use the point of view and method of the social sciences.
( 33 ) Religion arises as a phase or quality of the complex
life of the human spirit in its idealistic outreach . Religion
is continually subject to restatement under the influence of
the flowing stream of this complex life of the spirit. ( 3$
)
The fact that Ames's concept of God is so changeable,
that that which he calls God is so dependent upon human
thought, strongly suggests that his God is nothing but a
'concept. His God always corresponds exactly to human concepts,

26.
and as there is no external reality to which, either his God
or his concept of God corresponds, at least as far as we can
determine, we are bound to say that his God is wholly subjective,
simply a mental construct. If Ames should rejjly that this
argument is not valid, for all our concepts, including our
concepts of God, are changeable, I would point out a fundamental
distinction, although metaphysicians feel that there is an
ultimate cause back of reality, and are concerned to discover
this cause, they understand that the opinions of each generation
will have to be modified in the face of new data and thoughts
discovered by the next generation. Thus their concept of God
changes. But they feel that somewhere there is a true reality
which is for them God, and their ideal goal is to gain a concept
of God which will exactly correspond to the true reality. This
changeless concept is the goal. It would no longer correspond
to its objective reference if it changed. This would not make
God static, for one of the elements of the concept would be the
growth of God as that growth would take place in eternity. On
the other hand, Ames*s concept of God would never achieve
correspondence to an objective ideal. Its very nature is not
to achieve the totality of truth, complete, absolute, for all
time, but to change with each wave of social sentiment, with
each advance or regression of mankind until men shall be no
more. It does not look agead to discover God as he really is,
but it says that whatever the concept is that is God. Instead
of trying to make the concept correspond to God, Ames maizes
God correspond to the concept. Edmund H. Hollands says tnat
according to the view presented in Religion the god of religion
is made rather than given. He is neither transcendent nor
self-subs xstent. (35)
•
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III. GOD.
A. Empirical Definition and Proof.
Empirical search is unable to find God, or to assign
any spatial locality to him or his residence. This inability
to prove a transcendent God led to various theories of an
immanent God. But nowhere has God been found as one definite
object or observable fact within the known world of phenomena.
The question, Where is God? is replaced by the question What
is the nature of God? God has not been discovered as an object
outside or inside the material universe. Possibly a more
fruitful course may be to inquire whether God may not be more
truly and more fully understood as the reality of the world in
certain aspects and functions. The order and system wnich is
part of the universe is an aspect or element of God. Instead
of trying to deduce a First Cause from the reality of seeming
design we should be content with the reality as we have it.
This very order and beauty and design is not an indication of
a God on beyond and causing it, but is God. The old idea of
design pointing to a First Cause did not satisfy, for the
question of who made the First Cause still remained. We
should take the reality we have, in all its goodness, and let
that suffice. Doubtless this reality is finite and means
that thus we must be content with a finite God. Yet loyalty
to God does not demand that his perfection be demonstrated.
There is both hate and love in reality, but God is not
equivalent to all reality. God is the reality of the world
in certain aspects and functions; he is reality selected.
God is the world or life taken in those aspects wnich are
consonant with order, beauty, and expansion. He is reality
manifesting the functions of intelligence. Love, hut not hate,
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is identified with God. God is only where love is, and
where love is there God is. God as love is near to everyone
of us, and in love we live and move and have our being.
This love is personal, intelligent, and active in tne living
world of actual reality. In saying that God is reality
idealized we do not mean that he is fabrication or imagination,
but selection. The elements selected are empirically discernable
in reality. Love is present in both animals and men. Thus
reality in its most inclusive and far-reaching significance
manifests love. This empirical fact is the basis for the
religious interpretations of reality as God. Any conception
of the world without love is inadequate and empirically untrue.
In this same way other attributes of reality may be shown to
be included in God. Intelligence and rationality are parts
of life. Religion makes this wisdom a part of God. Through
its rational beings the world carries on rational processes,
thinks, reasons, understands. The fact that there are
rational beings is sufficient proof that rationality is a
part of reality, and idealized is part of God. Thus God
is present in the daily and commonplace experience of livin& .
The qualities of his nature are order, intelligence, and
love, nor does this nor any statement exhaust the divine
nature of the world. Eut this empirical statement is the
realm of the actual and verifiable. For it reality is loving
and lovable, known and knowable, orderly and ordering. Thus
accepted it may ^ive to life a genuine appeal, affording
guidance, comfort, and rewarding tasks. Reality is under-
standing and responsive as well as dependable and friendly.
God helps us to bear life's burdens and make life's decisions.
Only by order, intelligence, and love are sanity and
•
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achievement possible, and this order, intelligence, and love
bring a positive pleasure. Thus it seems that these are
true attributes of reality. The human desire that moral
ideals may triumph is evidence of the presence and will of
God. The hearts who love him separate the world's evil from
God, and he is for them omniscient, omnipotent, complete,
and absolute perfection, the perfect person. {56")
If the good in the universe leads to a concept of God,
v/hy is it not just as logical to say that trie evil leads to
a concept of the devil? Ames might ansv/er this by saying that
the evil is only apparent. The seeming evil is only a stage
in the good. Ames does say that this is the attitude of the
religious man toward evil. He does not believe that evil is
really the victorious factor in the universe. Good will
ultimately conquer completely, and is always in control.
Evil may even be an illusion, having no real existence.
Good is coherent, evil incoherent. In addition see pages
13, 27, 28, 36 r 37, 39, 43.
For a further refutation of Ames's empirical definition
and proof of God see pages 22-24.
G
30.
B. Infinite.
The religious man sees himself and the world as involved
in a vast set of cosmic relations. Each act, each seemingly
lone fact is a part of and connected with the whole. Out of
the past surge streams pregnant with meaning for the future.
All is a connected whole, and science makes the cosmic
connection loom still more vast. The religious man feels himself
to "be in the presence of the infinite. His conduct is loaded
with meaning for the whole. Life possesses dignity and moral
worth. He is trie child both of time and of eternity. In sky
and sea he beholds trie beauty of God. As his soul faces the
ever extending horizon reverence and deep humility awaken
within him. Although his smallest movement may affect the
whole, he knows ne is but a small part of this vaster life,
and he is filled with the "feeling of dependence." This is one
sure mark of difference between the religious und the non-
religious man. For seme these sublime and tender emo^tions
do not exist, or if they do they are choked at birth, or before.
Some scientists, being unable to verify these matters by
laboratory methods refuse to acknowledge tneir vdlidity. It
is impossible to prove religion to the man who has not experienced
it. The religious man comprehends something of his connection
with the whole of creation. His soul soars and descends to
the highest and profoundest emotions. Love and fear are his
by turn. Life is precious and serious. In every event ne
sees possibilities of both the love and tne wrath of God.
But he feels that God is on the side of the right and good
as felt by man's deepest sense. At least he believes that
the world includes or is capable of supporting a moral order.
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The truly religious devote their lives with a mighty zeal to
that which they "believe to be right. The pain and perplexities
of life they bear lightly, as unrealities of but a moment,
and under it all, and through it all, tueirs is that peace
which passeth understanding. The religious person feels
that in the long run all will be well, refuses to look on tne
dark side where so much is beautiful and good. The religious
person is essentially an optimist. The higher forms of religion
give the individual a sense of intimacy and security in the
midst of flux and immensity. Yet these higher religions
stress personal responsibility, and make clear the truth that
true worth is in the heart. On the heart depends accep tibili ty
of men with God. The individual may thus feel that in his
own right he is securely allied with the divine. "He is the
child of a beneficent providence which guards and sustains
him with infinite care "(37).
Yet the individual is not a law unto himself. Individuals
are dependent upon association for their experience of religion.
There is ground for believing that tne God with whom the individuals
commune is mediated through the Spirit of their associated life.
Without the nuture and direction of that communal power they
never could have come to know God nor the sense of participation
in his beneficience and goodness. Yet religious values do not
depend upon an understanding of them. Rather they are often
dampened by investigation. To the religious God is as the most
intimate friend and companion, chastening those whom he loves,
loving with a tenacious love, even though one wander far in
sin and ahame. "Our Father" has a meaning wherever men are
found. (38)
For my criticisms of Ames's "universe God" see pages 22-24.-
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1- The Largest Whole.
The group to which we belong, whether play group,
family, nation, or whatever it may be, seems for us to
have a kind of oversoul.. an existence over and above tne
individual members of the group. This whole is in part
the heart, soul, attitude, being, of the group as a ^roup
instead of as individuals. It is a larger whole, continuing
on after the old members may have been entirely replaced
by new. The individual stands in a definite "self -other"
relation to tnis whole , as he stands in such a relation
to other individuals. In religion the self stands in such
a "self-other" relation to the largest whole, or universe,
which then becomes God. This "other" is of the same nature
as the lesser "others" constituted of social groups.
This largest "djther" is as real as state or family, having
the substance of the actual world of things and people,
history and projected action. For philosophy it is the
Universal or Absolute, for science it is nature, or life,
for religion it is God. Whatever the "other" may be, wnetner
person, family, humanity, universe, or some other object,
it is reality vitally and impressively functioning in
the behavior and emotions of the self. Our love for
God is as sure and intelligent as is our
9
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love for our country or Alma Mater, but deeper and of more
consummate affection. however, the religious man knows that
there are evils in the world, but he Knows also that there are
-
good, happiness, and some righteousness. Tnese worthy qualities
he identifies with the divine. He does not think of God as
the equivalent of all that is, but as the ideal being who seeks
the realisation of the good. Evil may be regarded as unreal
or transient, as a stage in the proces.-, or as an incident in
the unfolding of the ideal. T "God is the power which makes for
righteousness.'" This concept of ^od is contrary to the
pantheistic notion of an absolute, static reality, complete
in itself. (39) 1
This "other" that Ames sets forth as God has no existence
outside of human consciousness. The universe is composed of
concrete particulars, and even if the whole is a unity it is
only such in the sense that the parts work together for a common
end. No one ever experienced such an "over-soul" as Ames speaks
of. We only experience particular elements produced by particular
entities within the collection of entities. Furthermore, the
whole is not personal, as Ames's theory tries to assume.
Personalities are concrete, particular, individual entities,
not conglomerate abstractions such as that which Ames describes
as tne "spirit of the whole." We really feel that Brown, Smith,
Jones, etc. are all friendly toward us, that they can be depended
upon to help us when we are in need, tnat they will observe the
rules of justice and love in dealing with us, and that tney
expect us to do the same in dealing with them. We do not feel
this way about some abstraction which is neither Brown, Smith,
"br Jones, but which in some mysterious way is the result of
them all. This would seem to be proved when we renounce the
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group composed of Brown, Smith, Jones, etc., and ourselves,
because they all turned out to be undesirable companions.
No matter how much we admire the constitution of the club, or
previously liked the group, we reject it when we find that
Brown is dishonest, Smith is selfish, Jones a snob, etc.
In short, if the majority of the individuals in our group are
helpful and give us satisfaction we have an affection and
feeling of dependence upon these individuals, but on them as
individuals, not as a group. Thus again we find that Ames's
concept of God has no objective reference. That which he
calls God exists only in human consciousness. There is no
such objective reality.
2. The Spirit of Living Beings.
"God is the Spirit of the world of living beings,
taken in their associated and ideal experience. God
includes the so-called material world which is the stage
of their action and the condition of their existence, and
God signifies also the order of their intelligence and
conduct. He is the grand total, living process, in which
they live and move and have their being. Men cherish
this corporate life God is their world, idealized and
personified in accordance with tneir deepest, most spiritual
insignt and endeavor. He is as real as their own nature,
and as vast as the unmeasured and inexhaustible implications
of their aspiration and imagination. With every discovery
of science and every increment of knowledge God is better
known, more profoundly revered, more definitely and vitally
experienced." (40)
God is the spirit of a people, and in so far as there is
-
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a world of humanity, God is the spirit of the world. ( 41
J. B. Pratt, author of The Religious Consciousness, has
well defined religion as "the serious and social attitude of
individuals or communities toward the power or powers which
they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests
and destinies." 'Whatever symbol a people may use for its
god, the substance of the idea of their god, the objective
reality, is the Spirit of that people. God's will is enforced
through the commandments of social custom. Pratt calls this
conception of God "subjective." But it surely is not subjective
in the sense of being individualistic. Neither is it a "mere"
idea, occurring simultaneously in the minds of a number of men.
(42)
Ames seems to think that God is not one definite bein t
but that God varies according to the variations among his
different peoples and followers. God really is what the
individual or people feel him to be. In saying that the God
of men is their world, idealized and personified in accordance
v/ith their deepest, most spiritual insight and endeavor, Ames
not only means that men take God to be such, but that he
actually is such. This means that Ames thinks that when we
eliminate the anthropomorphic creeds, in which no thinker
really believes, God is really just the cosmic whole. We
have a mystic feeling that this whole really is to us somewhat
as another personality. Even the sun and the showers, the
beauty of flowers, and the soft snow blanketing our last resting
places in the qui^e/ bosom of our kindly earth mother, to say
nothing of human friends and loved ones, all seem to say
"Child, it is all for thee, these are the tokens of my love
for thee." And so, as Ames would say, we are right in tninking
of it all as a person, and, although many of us cannot with Ames call
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it God, we do in it see God revealed.
Man grows his religion out of the depths of his life,
instead of gaining it through divine revelation. Religion
arises from men themselves. (43) Like society, familv, state,
industry, and their forms and organizations, religion and its
forms and organizations are ultimately voluntary associations
for the better realization of common wants. Their foundations
and sustained meaning are in the human spirit, and witncut
significance except as they express and satisfy human spirit. (44)
C. Finite.
Accepting the empirical good, beauty, and order of life
as God means a finite God. We have a finite world or no world
at all, and a finite God or no God at all. Loyalty to God does
not depend upon his demonstrated perfection. (45) Since the
idea of God held by any people is a reflection of their life
and culture God grows with growing cultures. Thus, not having
reached the limit of growth, God is finite. As the personified,
idealized order of reality God shares in any development of that
order. But although he is finite, God is as vast as all reality.
(46)
An empirical estimate of life secures the conviction that
the whole of things is modified by the activity of each factor.
Thus the individual is important in determining the fate of
the universe. In connection with the failure or success of the
kingdom of heaven the individual has responsibilities. Human
devotion and labor count in the fast scheme of things. God
needs our nelp. He is not absolute and self-sufficient.
Neither are individuals merged and lost in the infinite, but
each may acoelerate or hinder God*s victories. Religious faith
views men as instruments, aids, and allies in the realization
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of the divine will, which they find, at least in part, in the
will and purpose of individuals. Human devotion and labor
count in the vast scheme of things, hindering or accelerating
the fulfilment of God's victories. By this faitn men share
responsibility in the success or failure of the kingdom of
heaven. The self is a part of the universal, of the great
"Other." However, some religions, lacking empirical insight,
think of God as independent of human effort, as self-sufficient.
In these religions the individual is logt in the infinite. (47)
As the Common Will, experimenting through the deliberations
and ventures of social organizations and incarnating himself
in institutions God is concrete and accessible. (48)
Ames agrees with William James in holding that God is
finite, and desirably so* Botn feel that numan freedom is
possible only if God be finite. Ames also agrees witn James
in feeling that men must cooperate with God if the kingdom of
heaven is to come. God needs human help. These agreements
are also common to the best thought in the per sonalistic
.
philosophy, especially that of Professor Edgar Sheffield
Erightman.
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D* God As Reality.
1. God and Nature.
H. W. Schneider says that protestants v/ill prefer to
call the religion of Ames's Religion naturalism or humanism,
although Ames carefully avoids the distinction between man
and nature implied "by these labels, Schneider quotes Ames
as saying that God is not supernatural. God is wholly
natural, as are ideals. "Natural" implies an opposition
between the natural and supernatural. Thus the term may be
dismissed. Each term implies the other, nor Cc.n one properly
be used without the other. If it is to express all that is
experienced "natural" must be synonymous with real. But so
used the natural includes the ideal, mental, and spiritual.
Schneider quotes Ames as denying that we may drop one term of
a dualistic conception while retaining the other. Many
modern humanists commit this fallacy. Failing to find other
than empirical values they turn to a naturalistic humanistic
interpretation of the world. They deny God and the supernatural.
As a result they have a truncated world, the lower half of
the old dualistic order. In spite of themselves they separate
man from nature. They leave their humanistic realm suspended
between matter and the vacancy left by the removal of the old
supernaturalistic deity. Ratner, the empirical view should
lead tc a recognition that there is one process of life from
the lowest to the highest forms, ever emerging in new creations
Schneider points out that the religion of Ames is a
humane religion, a religion of social progress, the worship
of order, intelligence, and love. Since the fact of progress
is as much a natural as a human fact the universe contains
something divine. These ideals, with the effort in their
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realization, are as real as any fact can be. '^-hey are God.
Eut they are not the only reality. Though tne devil receives
small notice in Religion he is as real as God. Both are finite
Both may be fleeting in comparison with the endless motions
of the material universe. But both are empirical realities
and active forces. According to the religious tneory set
forth God is selected by his worshippers from tne world. (49)
(From data found on page 13» etc., I think Ames would deny
Schneider's assertion that the devil is as real as God.)
Durkheim, in hie Elementary Forms of the Religious Life ,
and Cornford, in his From Religi on to Philosophy , have well
argued that the cosmos is socially determined. In agreement
with them is Kant's theory that nature is phenomenal. Nature
is not subjective in the sense of being only an image in the
brains of men. Rather objects as Known are objects of social
usage and convention, matters not only of fact, but also of
value. We ourselves largely determine what nature is for us.
The picture of a Deity creating tne universe and all its
contents has little if any place in a genuinely scientific
world view. The abstract metaphysical question of the beginnin
of life is probably beyond our power to answer. Nature is a
tool for the great ideal ends of religion. Man is no longer
dumb before nature, but it has become increasingly flexible
and subservient to social requirements. Natural phenomena
and disasters are no longer blamed on God, but are seen as
resulting from natural causes. (50 )
Our concept of nature is largely determined by our social
experience. There is a very real truth in Durkneim's view
that the cosmos as we see it is a social affair, dependent
upon society. It occurred to Kant that we should regard
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nature as conforming to the laws of our pure, a priori,
synthetic judgment, or thought. Idealism, probably the most
dominant school of philosopuy since Kant, conceives tne
physical world of space and time according to the law and
temper of our own intelligence, ratner tnan in terms of
things as they are in tneraselves. Tnus God as the Spirit of
the Group, as the Common "."ill, with its idealizing tendency,
i& not unrelated to nature, "but is supreme over it. God
conceived in social terms is not inconsistent with the
conception of God as the God of nature when nature is thought
of as socially conditioned. (51 )
E. H. Hollands points out that according to Religion
God is tne spirit of the group, its common purposes and living
activities, conceived as continued into and supported "by at
least some of the forces and powers of tne world at large.
God is the idealization of a selected part of reality, including
mankind and an indefinite range of nature beyond man. Ke
includes that part of nature which in experience snows a
degree of orderliness, love, intelligence, and rationality.
Idealization means selection rather than fabrication in this
instance. God is those aspects of the world and of life wnich
are consonant with order, beauty, and expansion. (This is
set fortn in Religio n, p. 154.) (52)
In the presence of science and critical examination of
man's ideas of himself and his world, it is apparent tnat no
scientific or logical procedure of thought can establisn tne
existence of a god wno is the master creator. Kant's conclusive
criticisms overthrew tne arguments for a conscious ordering
will sustaining every law and every event. At most the argument
from design only makes God the carpenter dealing with materials
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already given; it does not account for the origin of the
material. The minor status of man in the cosmic system
largely invalidates the ontological argument. (53)
We have come to regard God as so immanent and dynamic
that it seems quite inconsistent to conceive him as honored
and gratified by adoration and flattery, such as was formerly
offered to tyrants and despots. (54)
For Ames God and nature are one as far as nature is good.
God is the good in nature. Eut the good in nature is all the
good in the universe, for all reality is nature according to
Ames. Our ideals, loves, hates, are all a part of nature.
This is a most logical view for if there is a separation
between the natural and the supernatural tne natural at once
is robbed of all meaning. It becomes a mechanistic and material-
istic system, impersonal, unexplainable . It is subject to all
the accusations brought against mechanism and materialism. No
theistic philosophy can endure a fundamental separation between
the natural and the supernatural. One need not read far in Ames's
writings before he can discover that Ames holds nature in high
regard, a friend and helper to man, so constructed as to support
man in his life activities. Also see pages 30-33, 43-44, 49-52.
2. Objective Reality.
Professor Leuba halds that there is no objective reality
corresponding to the term "God." God is distinctly an objective
reality, not simply a subjective image or concept; he is even
more than subjective reality, he is objective reality. God is
experienced reality, rather than an anthropomorphic concept or
metaphysical being of anthropomorphic type. He is the reality
of a social process belonging to the actual world. God is reality,
inclusive, and ideally evaluated, and not to be thought of apart
from that reality. (55) In numerous criticisms, such as those on
pages 22-24, I have tried to to show that Ames's God is not objecti
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3. Reality Idealized.
Many discerning souls no longer seek God outside the world
in the unknowable, nor in the realm of physical nature. Rather
they find God in the associated life of men. God is love,
serving, suffering, healing love, "binding men together for the
common good. Every constructive, fruitful organization of
people is a means of studying the divine, nor is it an accident
that we think of great social entities as great personalities.
Our college, city, state, and nation all have a personality,
calling out our affection and loyalty. We go so far as to
give faces and figures to nations. Thus is it not natural for
us to sum up the meaning of the whole of life in the person and
image of God? This seems inevi table. flnis seems the most
natural and simpj.es t way to represent to our minds and wills the
moral values and the spiritual realities of life. Our personalities
are influenced by contact with persons both real and ideal.
"God is the Great Ideal Companion." Communion with him gives
new appreciation of all that he signifies to us, "He is then
identified with Strength and T7isdom and Nobility." Loyalty
to him is striving to adhere to all that he means to us. Fe
tend to develop the image of some revered person to the point
where it serves as the most vivid symbol of the divine. Thus
we see God in Christ Jesus and this is a large source of the
comfort and contentment given by Christianity. In Jesus God
comes nearer and taK.es the form we can grasp and utilize.
The persons of the religious drama, men, Christ, the
Holy Spirit, and God, cannot be separated from each otner.
Together they form an organism. No one of these elements can
live without the others, nor witnout the whole. The self grows
by interplay with other selves, and could not exist witnout
them. Over and above the particular persons composing one's
ft
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group or country or world is the feeling of the entity of tne
group or country or world itself. Each class possesses an
individuality for which the members have loyalty and reverence.
This individuality has an objectivity and permanence above and
beyond any particular persons in it. It transcends them, yet
is in and through them. "If this be the nature of God as tne
Ideal Socius, tnen he too has at least such reality and objectivity.
He is the Soul of the world in which all other selves live and
move and have their being." (56)
God is good, not bad, reality idealized. The bad in
reality cannot be idealized, and so is not a part of (Jod.
"The quest for God as an intellectual possession is for a view
of the world which can be to some extent tationalized and
unified." (57)
Ames's God is the meaning of tne whole of life summed up.
The fact that we have to sum up this meaning proves that it is
not summed up as an objective fact. The use of the Merd "meaning"
implies that God is meaning for personality, and personality
is only found in individuals. Meaning can only exist as a
subjective content for individual persons. Thus God, as the
meaning of the whole of life summed up must be subjective, botji
because he is "summed up," and because he is "meaning."
Again, in his statement that God cannot exist without
manjAmes probably unconsciously implies that as dependent
upon man for his very being God is not an independent objective
being.
4.. The Concrete Universal.
As "Nature" is a concrete universal for science ""Vorld"
for politics, a.nd "Cosmos" for philosophy, so may not "God"
be a concrete universal for religion? A universal is used to
gather facts and experiences into a system, and to designate
1-
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this system. A universal is more than a class name, it means
an organization of factors into a whole. In this same way the
term "God" expresses order, purpose, and moral values in the
reality of "life" or "world." God is reality conceived as
friendly, as furnishing support for man's existence and the
realization of ideal ends. The religious man uses God as the
standard of reference for the adequacy of specific ideals.
In religious thinking God is the "frame of reference," seeing
everything, holding everything in his hand, ruling all the
forces of the world. Men desire some rule "by which they may
test their affairs, securing the approbation of the rule for
their affairs, or discovering what they should reject. i>uty is
such a frame and structure of conduct to wnich specific acts
are referred. The religious man uses God this way, as a
substantiation of individual conduct by a law or principle
which includes and supports it. He is the judge, umpire, and
referee. Only by such an objective standard are we able to
gain a sense of the relation of things.
rj
-his formulation of
custom into law providing a generalized expression of experience
for judging particular asts is thought of as the will and thought
of God. (58)
According to Ames, a universal is an organization of
factors into a whole. Such an organization can only take
place within a mind, and as his God is such an organization
it follows that his God is only in his mind, and in the minds
of those organizing the factors of reality as does Ames.
5. Social Process.
God is objective reality, not simply a subjective affair.
Gcd is the reality of a social process belonging to the actual
world. Even as the reality to v/hich the term "Alma, Mater"
r
45
applies is not a single person, so the reality to which the
term "God" refers is not a particular person, nor a single
factual existence, but the order of nature, including man and
all the processes of an aspiring social life. God is not the
image suggested "by the word, "but a social process belonging to
the actual world. The gods of religious experience are not to
be understood apart from that experience as abstract isolated
entities. Their being is in the action and outreachm^ of life
itself. (59)
A people f s national and cultural ideals are symbolized
in the majestic figure of their God. Gud is one with the will
and purpose of his people, apart from whom he cannot be under-
stood. The purpose, direction, and moral idealism of a people
reveal their God. God needs a people in order that he may
not become vague, weak, easily disbelieved. He cannot be
known outside of history and living experience, nor has man
been able to discover him as a fact among the facts of nature.
We cannot demonstrate his being by abstract arguments. But
look into the great pulsing stream of history and human lives
bound together in great societies and you will find the name
and will and power of God (60)
In functional psychology the statement of the genesis and
development of an idea carries its own indication of the truth
or reality of that idea. History reveals tne function and
value of the idea in experience. In so far as the idea aids
and furthers experience it is true. It is always relative
and conditioned, but for this very reason it is real. (61)
In this division v/e find Ames admitting tnat God is not
a particular person, nor a single factual existence. God
is the social process, says Ames. But, as I have tried to

show, there is no such objective concrete individual as the
social process. There is no such objective concrete totality,
"which," according to Hegel, (62) "means not any indefinite
multiplicity, but individuality alone, the particular and the
universal in an identity." The social process is only a
mental construct based on particular changes in individual
conduct. Thus God as social process is still only a subjective
concept, in spite of Ames's statements that he is objective
reality.
The will and purpose of a people can only exist in the
consciousness of the individuals composing that people,
and so as the will and purpose of a people Ames's God is on
another count simply a matter of individual consciousness.
The fact that Ames's God bears the stamp of tne social
and natural conditions under which it originated indicates
that his God is subjective, for social and natural conditions
so change and differ in different climes and times that no
objective reality could ever keep step with them.
That the concept of God is fruitful only proves that
it is fruitful, not that it is v^lid for an objective reference.
6. Personal Reality.
The social and genetic interpretation of the conception
of God involves the acceptance of personification and
anthropomorphisation as natural and legitimate. Religious
ideas thus become akin to poetry and art, but this does not
make them untrue or ineffective. (63)
If nature includes man and his works God is the
personification and idealization of nature. This personifi-
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cation of tne world does not add a foreign element, but
recognizes that as well as inanimate matter nature includes
living forms; especially it takes account of man with his
life and thought. It thus recognizes that aspect which to
man is most important and most real. Thus God is actual,
objective, but also near and intimate. God includes all
the factors which belong to ideal personality: wisdom,
kindliness, power, informality, charm, mystery, orderliness,
beauty, and any other element demanded. One's God is analogous
to one's Alma Mater, a benign and gracious being toward whom
he cherishes deep gratitude for nurture and continuing good
will and affection. In turn he is continually devoted to
her. She is not merely imaginary, but has objective and
tangible reality. She includes dirt, stones, gold, bonds,
human beings, information, education, tradition, ideals,
memories. She is an airy thing of song and story. She has
a character, so well defined that we are able to tell whether
or not certain things would be consistent with her spirit.
Thought of her comforts, inspires, rebukes, challenges, and
suggests standards to be maintained, and she snares with all
her children her good name and fame.
The idea of Uncle Sam is of the same character. He
is the personification of the United States of America,
which reality is made up of all the domains, mountains,
plains, forests, highways, cities, citizens, traditions,
institutions, and other belongings of the nation.
Uncle Sam is recognized as a personal entity, morally
responsible, legislating, negotiating, deliberating,
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planning, executing his will, building, employing, and holding
the power of life and deatn over millions of people. He may be
rich or poor, and may have much or little influence and regard
among foreign peoples.
In this same way God is the personified reality of the world.
Ke is more than a mere idea. He has substance, energy, power.
God is the common will, the spirit, of mankind. He is seen in
men, especially in their benevolent corporate life. The image
of God marks the humblest souls and is yet more clearly revealed
in the great leaders and saviours of the race. In some measure
it is ^fee true of every man that "He that hath seen me hath seen
the Father." We construct the ideal personages of our faith
after the models given by the individuals we know. (64)
Prayer lays a basis for the sense of a personal relation
to the whole order of nature. Nature includes intelligence
and becomes an object toward which it is possible to feel tne
attitudes of intimate and tender relationships. "Prayer is
the expression of the sense of being at home in the universe"
(65 ). The expression of this sense strengthens and enhanses
it. Even an atheistic view of the world v/ould not destroy
prayer, for man v/ould continue to pour out his soul to the
mountains and seas as he does now in poetry. But prayer as
an expression of man's relation to the universe recognizes that
the universe not only contains personality, but it endeavors to
sum up all reality in terms of an inclusive personal Being.
Prayer is communion with that wnicn the communicant conceives
as the supreme power of tne universe, the source and being of
ultimate reality, tne highest and best he is able to conceive.
The value of such communion depends upon tne individual's conception
of God. If he regards God as sympathetic personality ne will
be strengthened, cheered, uplifted, and urged on to better things
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by such a communion. Prayer through the sense of communion
with an ideal personality may strengthen one's morale. It
may give one more strength and insight througn suggestion for
the day's tasks. It may give a sense of companionship, so
essential to joyous living. Thus he who prays may become a
better member of society, making him more likable, more helpful.
By aiding a man to maintain better control, achieve relaxation,
think more clearly, and sustain courage and initiative, prayer
is certain to have social consequences. If people can be
induced to pray for a common end they will be impelled toward
the attainment of that end. Prayer is a stimulus to work, and
as such is an element in social betterment. Thus prayer not
only brings about subjective changes, but it also produces
objective effects. Not only does prayer have a reflex effect,
but it moves and directs other hearts in widening circles of
unknown range. Prayer does not imply a personal God. Some
types of religion lack a clear idea of a personal God, but
employ prayer. Buddhism, for example, rejects the notion of
personality as inapplicable to supreme reality, yet Buddhism
emphasizes prayer. Both pantheists and mystics in the western
world often combine a denial of a personal God with prayer.
Many mystics feel that God transcends any form of personality
we know. (66)
To call the universe God, and then say that God has
personal attributes because seme beings in the universe have
personal attributes is to solve the problem in an unsatisfactory
and superficial manner. If God is just tne universe why call
it God? Thought becomes confused and unfruitful when we
arbitrarily change the meaning of terms, and assign terms
traditionally having other meanings to entities or things
which traditionally have been known by other terms than the ones
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arbitrarily assigned to them. Thus Ames has no logical
right to assign the term "God" to the universe, unless he
openly admits that he is a pantheist in the most impersonal
sense. Again, it is misleading 4nd false to say that the
universe as a whole is personal, or contains personal attributes
simply because there are personal elements within the universe.
Just because man is personal we have no hint that rocks are
personal. True, the universe includes wisdom, kindliness,
etc., but these personal attributes are not attributes of tne
total entity in the sense that it is wise, kind, etc. Tven
if the whole universe is in every part the consciously willed
product of a supreme person, it is not wise, kind, etc.
God is the seat of wisdom, kindliness, etc., but the product
of his wisdom and other personal attributes, although constructed
in accordance with personal attributes, do not themselves
have such attributes. God who causes and controls tne universe
may be kind, and men who live in the universe may be kind,
but tne universe itself as a wiiole is not in the least kind,
regardless of how useful to men it may be. The usefulness
is due to the power that made the universe, and not to the
universe itself.
The very fact that Ames has to personify the universe
proves that taken by itself the universe is not a person.
Our Alma Mater contains personalities in tne shape of students,
faculty, and other people connected witn the institution.
But tne institution as a whole is not personal, and does not
contain personal elements. In fac4 there is no institution as a
whole. My professor of English may rebuice me because of my mistakes in
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English, my philosophy professor may give me new ideals, the
desire to stand high in the opinions of several prominent
alumni may constantly urge me to do my best in every task.
But the institution as a whole never rebuked me for a mistake
in English, nor ever influenced me in any way. There is no
such thing as an institution as a whole. All there is is
Brown, Smith, Jones, the thousand acres of land, the statue
of the founder, the new chemistry building, the library, with
six hundred thousand individual volumes, etc. Even if we grant
that there is a book in which all the ideals of the institution
are written, that is only one more individual thing. The ideals
themselves have no existence except as they are aetive elements
in the minds of individual persons.
The universe is only a collection of individual entities,
and no matter how smoothly they all work together for a common
end, they are still individual entities, and there is no
single entity, the universe, except as a collection of individuals.
Thus the universe may contain persons, with personal attributes,
but it can not itself be a person, or have personal attributes.
I may feel that the arms of Brown, Smith, and Jones are ever
ready to help me and encourage me, I may feel that there is a
supreme person back of the universe who will so rule the universe
as to help and encourage me, but apart from individual persons
the universe is a lifeless, impersonal thing, neither knowing
me nor caring for me. Thus Ames's God is largely an illusion,
an opiate, which blinds us to the pain, but allows the ill to
continue its deadly destruction. We may fool ourselves into
thinking that the universe as a whole will help us, but altnough
we may be made to feel better, never an atom of help will it
bring to us outside of the ^py^o^^^^^yielp our own conceit
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
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furnisnes. There are only three possible sources of help in
the universe. 1. Our own intelligence may help us by guiding
us to a more fruitful use of objective reality, as well as of
our own personal resources. 2. Other persons may so help us.
3. The supreme person, who is not the universe, but who causes
and controls the universe, may so help us.
I will now continue with Ames's argument.
Reality is personal in the same way that it is orderly,
intelligent, and possessed of good will, or love. Not ail
reality is personal, but there is personality, such as human
personality for example,- in reality. It seems that we may also
say that God is personality, as we said ne is order, intelligence,
and love. The scientific view is coming to be that wxmtever is
is a development of nature. Human personali ty , and all personality,
is thus part of nature, and in so far as there is personality
nature, or the world, is to that extent personal. Thus God,
as he is part of reality, is so far personal.
If God is personal he is limited, finite, but finite
things may be sublime and great. r±he personality of God is
in principle the same as that of a group, corporation, or state.
God is nature, including human beings, operating for certain
ends through individuals and institutions. God speaks in concrete
terms, through the voice of man and the significant facts of
nature. As an analogy to show the way in which reality is
personal and is God let us draw a word picture of a traveler
on a train, feeling that his safety is due to a great system
of facts: the dependable engineer, the watchful train crew,
the correct construction of cars, rails, and fixtures, the
laws of nature, atomic action, tensile strength, etc. All
this gives him a feeling of safety. He may grow to regard
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the system as personal, a great encompassing Power, to which
the name God is given. Thus we have a friendly universe. We
realize friendliness through personal associations, and make
it tne avenue to God. ' s/e live in a world of persons, coming
in contact with persons on every hand, profiting by tneir
contributions to life's supply of goods. In all this friendly
surrounding of persons God is recognizably manifest.
We hear much of tne vast heartless pnysical nature tnat
weighs down upon humanity and threatens us with destruction.
Why not insist more upon the reality of personality, tne inner
point of view, the love, sympathy, and cherisned values?
Personal values, imagination, purposes, ends, are just as
real in the world as the world of science. The personal
elements are just as real as tne empirically objective. 1he
beautiful for persons is for persons actually beautiful.
Value is not measured by time, nor denied by finiteness. A
life may be short, but it is good while it endures. In spite
of its pains there is abundant joy in life. Lven our discontent
is because of higher ideals not yet accomplished, and is tnus
prophetic and inspiring. Man, his works, and nis aspirations
are all a part of nature, and nature, and so ^od, includes
personality as one of its attributes. Only by tnus considering
our personal, subjective experience as part of the world, just
as truly a part as the empirical world of science, does the world
have meaning. True empirical procedure demands tnat we
recognize that most immediate and worthful element of reality,
the personal. The personal, social conception of nature is
more original, real, and appreciable than the abstract,
natural-s.cience interpretation.
The conception of God changes wi th the changing cultures
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of his people. Cruelty, mercy, tyranny, righteousness, and so
on, all have their counterparts in the &od of tne peoples
possessing these characteristics. Tnen personality became
clearer in human nature God became more clearly personal and a
Father and Friend to man. God is more than a projection of
human ideals. Ideals are real. In the ideal aspects of
experience God is immediately possessed through numan insight
and feeling. He is not supernatural, but wnolly natural,
just ao are ideals. Yet there is no distinction between
natural and supernatural. Yet one term implies the otner.
Modern "humanism" often commits tne fallacy of supposing that
only empirical values are discoverable, and God and tne super-
natural are not real. They leave only tne lower half of tne
old dualistic order. There is ratner one process of life
from the lowest to the highest forms. The old is ever emerging
into new creations, which are yet not sharply discontinuous
with the old. The misunderstanding of man's upward reaching
ideals gave rise to the contrast between tne natural and the
supernatural. To place physical nature on one side and man
as a helpless dreamer on the other side does not correct the
error. ( 67
)
Human beings are naturally expressive, and from birth
are bound up with a social situation. Conversation naturally
assumes a social form, as between persuns. Yet conversation
is not always between actual persons. A person in a lonely
place may people his environment with numerous persons. He
may imagine some object to be a person, or he may imagine
himself, or part of himself, to be a person. Within himself
he may become a whole array of persons, among wnom conversation
takes place. Thus he may talk to himself, or more properly,
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he may talk witft the people of his imagination, or with' the
objects personified by nis imagination. Thus prayer may take
place as conversation to some imaginative person, or object
personified by imagination. Prayer is conversation with another,
but the other may be an idealized self, lacking objective
reality. Prayer may even be nothing more than a mechanical
flow of words as in the case of much ritual prayer. Originally
it was addressed to a person, but as the process became mechanical
the other person to whom it was addressed was forgotten, and
the prayer became simply a mechanical flow of words. Yet on
the whole, prayer is the direction of thougnt and affection
toward those ideal selves and persons that engage the attention
of all idealis tically impelled people. ( 68)
Mueller maintained orphanages in England by prayer, but
in reality God heard, the prayers only as they
were heard by men and women, and answered them only througn
human agencies. This brings up the question of the mediation
of human beings, and the relation between man and God. If we
conceive God as reality, characterized by idealistic tendencies
and emergence of personality, it is possible to see prayer as
a real, vital, and intelligible experience. Tnis assumes that
God at least includes human intelligence, and hears and responds
in the sphere of that intelligence. The most realistic prayer
occurs within a social group. Here the prayers are aduressed
to the deity, but he is felt to be present in the hearts of his
devotees. Not only is such prayer an address to the tnought
and feeling of those present, but it is also directed to the
deeper nature which all share, and in wnich they recognize
their profounder kinship. oucn prayer is a quest for a rignt
attitude, for a more adequate point of view, for a submergence
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of selfisn interests, for a clarifying and quickening oi
spirit. Tnus the sense of the wider life and greater movement
within which tne deliberations and aspiratiuns of tne group
are set are renewed. "Nowhere is trie sense of God more real
and potent than in a company of devout souls sincerely seeking
insight and guidance. God is surely found there, if anywnere,
in the Spirit of tne World, flowering in that Presence; in the
Oversoul, "brooding through those hearts attuned to noble
purposes and endeavors. So long as man nas a genuine, organic
place in tne order of reality, that order is marked by at least
so much personality as man attains." If we reject this medium
on the ground that it is "merely human," and thus not integral
with tne divine, we reject the only means of establishing
intelligible relations with God as conscious personality.
Forfeiting this interaction of individuals with God through
the medium of the social group leaves prayer in the realm of
blank mystery and meaningless words. The rational meaning of
prayer depends largely upon this relation between human beings
and ultimate reality. ( 69)
The God-idea is formed in terms of personality. The
conception of personality involves purposive action, rather
than static beina . 7e can only tnmK of the onaracter of a person
in terms of what he does. The idea of a supreme Person necessarily
involves in the highest degree the elements of will, purpose,
and movement toward great goals. To conceive a person in terms
of mere existence is a contradiction in terms, a person is
more than a simple fact. Human beings can only think in
reference to ends, needs, and values, as a teleological idea
the God-idea shares fundamentally in the nature of all ideas.
(Wieraan, H. N.
,
Religious Experien ce and Scientific Method
,
pp. 270-271. ) ( 70
)

Ames argues that to the extent that there are persons in
the universe the universe is personal, and as God is tne
universe he is on this same basis personal. On this basis,
that in the human and animal personalities the universe has
personality, God's personality would seem to be limited to
human and animal personality. Thus the God of Ames, as far
as he is personal, is simply human persons and whatever animal
persons there may be. As these persons are individuals, and
as no "oversoul" or unity of tne whole is discoverable, we
can only have a God founded in tne unity of the whole as a
product of our own imagination. Even pragmatism proves that
there is no such thing as an "oversoul" or universal composed
of all, yet not being any one individual. It is always individuals
that do things, never the group. Our Alma Mater never signed
any diploma; they are always signed by some particular official
of the institution. These "oversouls " and universals only exist
as human, and perhaps aa animal and divine, concepts. Thus again
the God of Ames is only a human concept. Animals would not
a
be able to have so complicated/concept , and if we follow Ames
God himself can have no concept, for he is a concept.
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF GOD TO HUMANITY.
A. Mysticism.
Mysticism is a non-rational, emotional experience, claiming
to be the highest form of religious experience. It is the
experience of union with the divine, both the ecstatic experience
and the road to it being beyond adequate description. In fact
what may prove to be the road for one may not be for another.
The experience may not come to him who struggles diligently
for it, and it may come to him who least expects it. There is
no method of proving to others that the eeig found is really
God. The more mysticism is scientifically investigated the
less valid its claims are seen to be. While psychological
analysis may cast doubt upon the mystics' explanation of the
origin and meaning of mystical states, we may still acknowledge
the factual nature of the mystic states. Modern psychology
shows the causes of mystical states are secondary, states of
the blood or nerves, fatigue, shock, or prolonged fixation of
attention. Yet these transports and ecstasies are of joy or
bliss beyond description, but transient and swiftly passing,
yet giving a satisfaction, a sense of union with a harmonious
and complete reality. However, the ordinary emotional states
contain elements which are part of tne mystical state. They
have much in common.
The distinguishing doctrine of mysticism is that of the
futility of knowledge to penetrate the real mysteries of life
and give access to the heart of reality; the necessity of turning
to feeling and direct action to reach tne goal is tne result.
Mysticism separates the life of feeling from the life of reason,
choosing feeling as the superior. Modern psychology holds that
there is no fundamental barrier between tne two realms. We
can find God through knowledge and thought. Critical ideas of
•
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God may be even more satisfying than naive conceptions, nor do
they exclude belief in God and the practice of tne presence
of God. There may be union and cooperation of emotional life
and reasoning. Religion may be mystical, but not mysticism.
It is mysticism in religion, with its break from intelligence,
that is the basis for tne warfare between science and religion.
The mystical sense does give the feeling of narmony, union,
expansion, and mystery, but every vital and pleasurable event
is mystics; 1 in this sense. This mystical quality may be found
in even the severest logical and metaphysical thought. The
thrill of discovering a penetrating insight or solving idea, or
a productive working hypothesis, is of tne essence of tne
mystical feeling. Every normal person finds a degree of this
elexir in some interest or achievement, a truer type of mysticism
would seem to be milder, more thoughtful, more natural, than tne
older extreme type. Instead of self torture and unnatural
life this new mysticism advocates an intelligent, thoughtful,
serious life. It would live for tne Highest physical and
spiritual ideals, caring for the nealth, strength, and highest
development of both body and soul. This new mysticism would
make the most of this present wo|(ld. This milder mysticism
enjoys the emotional satisfactions, but at least its more critical
students do not ascribe its experiences to peculiar powers of
access to divine reality. According to this milder mysticism,
set forth by Professor J". B. Pratt, in The Religious Consciousness
,
p. 359, every religious person might claim mystical experiences.
Yet no one need on that account tnink himself peculiar or
especially favored. This experience may come from a well-
rationalized religion. It may be perfectly natural and
intelligible, yet mystical in the sense of giving a feeling of
i
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peace, harmony, and inspiration. In this light religion may
be a matter of normal experience, yet mystical. ( 71)
Ames does not give sufficient recognition to tne fact
that to explain the psychology of mystical experiences, or
describe the psychological processes taking place during
such experiences, does not destroy tneir validity or objective
reference. The psychologist may describe the psychological
processes taking place during a visual experience. He may
also point out that people have hallucinations in which they
think they see objects which in reality do not exist. But all
e
this does not prohibit us from belivirig that our visual experiences
are valid, and that when we see a chair a chair is really there.
To explain the process does not determine its validity.
Furthermore, God might even choose to reveal himself througn
ordinary psychological phenomena, or for that matter, even
through what would seem to empirical observation to be
hallucinati ons
.
B. Humanity Is not Wholly Dependent on God.
Humanity is not wholly dependent upon God. Some feel
that when things go wrong according to our standards it is
only God's way of working out a better plan in a better way
than we know. They feel that his ways are not our ways , and
that humanity is weak and wholly dependent for progress upon
God. However, man has by his own strength made much progress,
and he still can do so. Evidences of such progress are
communication, transportation, and peace treaties.
God is not a great anthropomorphic person able to survey
all past human history and all past events, as well as the
present, thus being able to tell us what is best. We are not

61.
justified in regarding God as such an all wise prophet to. whom
we may go for information and guidance instead of using our
own human intelligence. God is useful in practical living and
in aesthetic satisfaction. But we should not depend upon God
to make our decisions. God is not an omniscient, anthropomorphic
prophet, able to tell us the safe road to our desired naven.
This attitude and use of God is antique. ( 72
In denying God the ability to survey all past human events
Ames might simply mean that God was not able to know everything
that happened. However, in consideration of Ames's general
attitude regarding God, it would seem that he is denying God
the attribute of memory reaching back through the period of
human history. His God is not able to know even all present
human events. In consideration of the nature of his God, it
would seem that his God can only know what the individual man
knows, as well as the knowledge of others which the individual
man is able to take advantage of, or use, either consciously or
unconsciously.
C. Human Freedom.
Moral determinism was founded on physical determinism,
which modern science has overthrown. Althougn human freedom
is limited by objective factors it nevertheless exists. Modern
moral theory recognizes that man is a creature of impulse,
habit, and reflection. At first his conduct may be blind and
impulsive, but through memory and imagination he becomes aware
of the course of his action. By reflective selection he follows
routes of conduct appealing to his disciplined judgment. His
insight modifies the behavior called forth by his needs and
invironment. Memory helps him to see the consequences of his
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acts. In imagination he works out various options, choosing
that which appeals to him as "best. Although established
habits have some control they are far from absolute dictators.
Hew developments and achievements are accomplished, thrusting
into the future and the unknown. A man's freedom is bounded
by his habits and reflective insight.
Formal freedom consists in absence of barriers to action.
A prisoner can not go where he will. Real freedom consists
in ability to take advantage of opportunities. A paralyzed
person may be free from prison bars, but he is not really free
to go where he will. Freedom like moral action consists in the
presence of alternatives presented to the mind of the agent for
his consideration . The ability to delay the answer, weigh
various factors, investigate numerous suggestions, and try them
out in imagination, is the heart of the matter. If sucn
opportunities of deliberation are present there is freedom, if
not there is little or no freedom. Thus the nature of a
situation or lack of knowledge may efiectually destroy freedom.
Although choice of ende is due to character, a man's
character is not a fixed, unchangeable entity. The fact that
a man is called upon to make decisions indicates that he has a
moving, changing self confronting a changing social and material
environment. The environment changes, and so man can only
fulfill his needs by cnange , not by obeying a system of rigid
habits. Habits must be both made and modified. (73)
Ames does not need to worry mucn about tne problem of
human freedom, for there seems to be nothing in nis God which
would prohibit human freedom. It would seem that for Ames
human freedom would be in more danger from mechanistic and
material forces than from divine power.
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D. God Is Friendly.
One of religion's deepest elements is the feeling of at-
homeness, which Schleierraacher called the feeling of dependence,
of surrender, and of adjustment. This harmony is most readily
achieved through the warmth of association with one's fellows.
( 74 ) The idea of God set forth in this paper gives one a sense
of friendliness in the universe. It gives one a sense of companion
ship in tasks, confidence and support in times of trouble and
need, and a feeling that God will take care of that which is
beyond one's own strength. Such an idea of God has the appeal
of known and felt reality; it is the personified realization
of this experienced reality. As this reality is better understood
through science the concept of God becomes richer and more adequate
( 75 )
The wise man will seriously, but not excessively, consider
the end of his life, do his best here, and continually intrust
himself to the encompassing life of God. With God he may rest
the final issues of both life and death. ( 76 )
As Ames's God is only a human concept it seems absurd to
consider the problems involved in God's relationship to humanity.
Mysticism as a communion with God becomes simply a subjective
affair. Far from being wholly dependent upon God, humanity
can get no help from a supernatural personality, for there is
no such being.- Man's sole help is himself, other human beings,
and the material universe and such selves as may exist in the
natural order, such as animals, if they be selves. As far as
the problem of freedom is concerned, Ames's God only affects it
as would a very influential ideal. The friendship of Ames's
God only amounts to the feeling that there are many good
people in the universe and numerous physical facts which contribute
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to human welfare and which will give help in times of need.
Ames can not logically feel, 8.s could James, that the ever las ti
arms are underneath all creation, preserving and caring for it
and for us. Logically Ames T s universe is an impersonal,
unconscious mass rolling around in space. Within the whole
there are a few weak personalities and selves, struggling
to realize ends which they desire and keep from being blotted
out in the struggle. The universe as a wnole can neither know
nor care for them. These conscious beings may band togetner
for their own mutual good, but beyond themselves and what help
they can themselves extract from helpless matter they are
helpless. Their fate is determined by their ability to cope
with each other and the physical universe. Of course Ames
denies this, but how can a universe with no supreme personal
power back of it be otherwise?
•
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V. CONCLUDING CRITICISMS.
A. Criticisms of Ames's "Social God."
". E. Hocking understands that Ames identifies God
with what God has been supposed to do for men and what ne
means to men. as we "become clear as to what God means in
human experience God becomes coincident with wnat the spirit
of tne social group means in nuraan experience. This tends
to identify God with tne social group spirit. Hocking thinks
this method of defining God to be fair, and tne conclusion
a fair and powerful challenge. Partially God is in what ne
does, and to be identified with phases of society. But if
Ames's method is to receive thorough application we must
also consider tne differences between God and Society. Can
the "Social God" satisfy the needs of the individual? Certainly
society often fails to deal with the individual justly, adequately.
Human history is strewn with tne wreck of nonest causes. If
Gods go to battle with nations they must suffer with the
vanquished. Also there is the appeal to a greater than society,
or armies, or victory itself : "Thou, God, who didst no
t
go
out with our armies, give us nelp from trouble; for
vain is the help of man 1 ' (77). Society is not an organism,
but only in the perpetual process of becoming one. Only an
actual organism could play tne part of God. The bodies,
services, expressible thoughts, and subconscious impulses
of men would have to be in an organism playing tne part of
God. Such is tne social ideal, but what it still lacks of
complete reality is of terrible moment for tne lives of
individuals. If the social spirit becomes our God tne
social judgments become absolute. Before this judgment
even the good is often damned. But tne advocate of tne
#
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"Social God" may reply: "Show me a "better." Religion and
metaphysics must accept responsibility for meeting tae demand.
But, again, we reply: "God has been believed to do better,
his function is to do better, nor is tne social spirit identical
witn wnat God practically means."
The "Social God" cannot furnish tnat "peace" which is
one of religions chief characteristics. In society tne re is
no thinking when v/e cease to think, nor any will when we
fail to will, nothing, no help whatsoever, except that which
we ourselves supply, '"hatever society does it does through
individuals, nor is t^e "Social God" more self-conscious tnan
the most self-conscious of its members. Such a God is no
wiser tnan the wisest of us, keeps fraternal pace with our
spirits, and shares our limitations. He is altogether such
as v/e are. He can hardly claim to be without sin. V/e cannot
rely upon society without criticism. It is not a valid
object of worship, nor a source of peace. Such a satisfying
object must be more than the "Social God." If the world is
worth aspiring in it must be more tnan a mere chance, \7here
there is no individual aspiration there is no religion and
no true worship. Religion is always the affair of individual
minds, and seeks an individual response. The spirit of society
never makes quite an individual response, "hen society conferred
rights upon me it never thought of me. Any deity who, like
the "Social God," is fallible, mortal, less than completely
real, f.^ils to meet the need for peace, for freedom of aspiration,
for individual response. This does not deny tne theory of
the finite God, nor even polytheism, "but the value of any
finite god depends on his being an aspect of tne God wuo is
not finite" (78 )
.
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Historically "social gods" have not "been sufficient.
Always it seems that some god of nature stands above and
behind tne gods directly concerned with nuraan life. Tnere
is always an ultimate being uncontained in all tne plastic
and associable snapes of tne religious consciousness, as
religion becomes more highly developed it tends to withdraw
from society as a wnole. Txie religious spirit reacnes its
hignest development wnen society is disintegrating, -according
to the tneory of tne "Social God" the opposite snould be true.
The very salvation of society depends upon its loving something
higher than this world. Not only tne individual, but society
must lose its life in order to save it. Only by fixing its
attention far beyond tribe and nation nas modern JJurope
become possible.
The above opinions rest upon zne following metaphysical
propositions, as Hocking states. 1. Every finite being is
dependent as is every empirical knower; man is not self-
sufficient. 2. Society is dependent, not only like man
being dependent on another and having to accept wnat is
given as fact, but also being dependent on the prior bein^
of its members. 3. Society is a matter of degree, not merely
a matter of fact, tne degree of association depending upon
tne conerence of tne associated terms; this depends on tne
relation of those members to a being not identical with any
of tnem. Society depends on a prior relation of individual
minds to tne true, in its most obvious aspect tne world of
nature. 4. Nature is dependent. Society ultimately depends
upon the relation of individual minds to that upon which
nature depends, which, wnatever it is is God, for whatever
controls the universe is God. Worship is tne effort to
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approach this reality, aiming to go behind whatever is dependent.
Society is dependent, and so will not do for an object of worship.
The religious instinct of mankind wants to know what the universe
apart from society, and after society is through with us is
going to do with us. (79)
B. Pragmatism Fails to Furnish a Satisfactory Philosophy of
Religion.
Pragmatism is closely allied with empiricism.
Pragmatic empiricism denies the reality of the self and
explains the categories of thought as deposits of racial
experience. It either runs counter to our self-experience
or is led astray by an obsolete conception of reality.
It lacks insight into the unique nature of thought as some-
thing which can arise only within the thinking agent itself.
It fails to account for experience, and logically leads to
hopeless skepticism. In its failure to recognize a unitary
and abiding self pragmatic empiricism logically places itself
in the camp of complete epis temological agnosticism. It
accepts experience as an ultimate fact, concerning whose
presuppositions we can ask no questions. (80) The instrument-
alistic type of pragmatism substitutes plastic ideas, to be
experimentally verified, for the stable truths of rationalism.
We cannot accept instrumentalisra in so far as it insists
that all is change and denies all certainty. No true ex-
perimentation is possible unless we have at least stability
of the conditions which make the experiment significant and
stability of the mind doing the experimenting. (81)
Pragmatism^ unique element is that it assumes that
utility is not merely the test of truth, but its essence.

Verification is not only the test of truth, "but is truth.
Truth is identical with its utilitarian verification. But
this is to destroy truth. If truth is not absolute it is
nothing. If truth is simply a concrete process of verification
within the individual it would seem to lead to complete
scepticism. Pragmatism is not provable by its own criterion
of truth, for it is not found to be the most satisfactory
conception of truth by the majority of people. Pragmatism
is forced to use reason to justify itself and to dethrone
reason. It has to assume the traditional conception of
truth in order to establish its own truth. (82) A vital
difficulty with pragmatism is that when we choose our belief
it ceases to be our belief. We suspect that our will tips the
balance of evidence and we feel that our chosen hypothesis is
only subjective, whereas a belief is the reference of tne
mind to an object assumed to be real objectively. The suspicion
of subjectivity destroys belief. Pragmatism makes the error
of falsely converting "All true propositions work" into "All
propositions that work are true." (83) We have no right to
give up the effort to find truth in despair. Pragmatism
does just this, giving up too easily to tne agnostic view
of metaphysical truth. V/e must presume that whatever in the
universe can affect us is connected with us by lines which
our knowledge can trace. "Tnere is no inaccessible truth."
(84) Pragmatism is ambiguous. Not only do the different
types of pragmatism contradict each other in various elements,
but there is confusion as to just what tne end is which is
served by true ideas. Untrue ideas may have practical results,
and some true ideas are not verifiable by norainalis tic or
biological pragmatism. To make one science trie source of
our only criterion of truth, as does biological pragmatism,
t
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is to exclude from the category of the true all that does
not fall, either directly or indirectly, witnin the realm
of the science chosen. Vaihinger recognizes taat his biological
pragmatism cannot prove many things that nevertheless are true.
Biological pragmatism tnus leads to skepticism and so fails
as a criterion of truth. (85)
In its positivistic tendency pragmatism leaves us with
no rational theory of reality. In contrast to pure positivism
pragmatism does not deny all metaphysical knowledge, but rather
leaves the metaphysical question open. Thus there is confusion
and contradiction among tnose who pose as pragmatists. Often
pragmatism is so unclear, hesitant, inconsistent, and purely
negative in dealing with tne deeper problems of metaphysics
that it seems to be more a method of doing without a philosophy
than a philosophy. (86) In its judgment of the incompetence
of pure reason in metaphysics pragmatism is agnostic. Since
pragmatism denies the power of reason to solve our questions
about the universe it turns elsewhere, to the will. We may
roughly define pragmatism as an appeal to the will to achieve
conclusions in vital matters of belief, or to aid in realizing
them. Denying the power of reason to come to some metaphysical
conclusion, pragmatism turns to a trial and e^ror method of
determining the best metaphysics. (87)
Many pragmatists are apologists for religion. On tne
basis of utility as the test of truth much can be said in
favor of religion. Religion and pragmatism both give a
high place to value -j udgments . However, in its more radical
forms pragmatism denies truth as transcendent and makes it
simply utility, thus making the truth of religion notning
more than its good consequences. God is only what ne is
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experienced as being. On this "basis we cannot affirm tne
existence of God as transcendent, for we do not experience
him as such: he is only what he is experienced as, nothing
more. Thus the objects of religious faith "become largely
illusion. Their truth is coextensive with the practical
consequences resulting from belief in them, and there ends.
"The belief has no objective validity This is the
conclusion to which radical pragmatism logically leads ."
Thus pragmatism is unsatisfactory as an epistemology and as
a philosophy of religion. A. E. Taylor points out that
pragmatists show a great impatience with the business of
quietly and steadily thinking things out. Pragmatism fu,ils
to see the importance of the critical problem. It is less
a definite way of thinking than a series of guesses at truth.
(88) In religion the objective truth is the only thing that
can set us free. "For religion is the orientation of the
human self to what it regards as the most real thing in the
world. God is nothing if not that on which we depend."
But every chosen belief, every man-made idea of God depends
too much on us: "We cannot swing up a rope which is attached
only to our own belt." If we choose a belief we brand it as
depending on us and it fails to worlfc. (89)
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SUMMARY
.
First we considered Ames's attitude toward religion
and its principal problems. T7e have found that he regards
science as having overthrown tne traditional concept of God,
as well as other religious traditions. Ames feels that the
empirical method of historical and genetic study through
the means of functional psychology is the most fruitful
method of studying religion, and most productive of truthful
information. He regards the soul, or self, as a unity of
mind and organism, "organism-displaying-mental-abili ty ,
"
as he calls it. In an earlier source, The Hew Orthodoxy ,
he comes nearer to self psychology when he says that self
is the mind as it knows itself, For him religion is the
search for practical values; theology is essentially tne
systematic rationalization of customs and ideas hanging over
from the religion of our fathers. Ames does not think that
"Freudianism invalidates religious values by discovering tneir
sources. He does not regard the universe as essentially good
or evil metaphysically. Good and evil are adjectives given
to those things which aid or hinder selves in attaining
desired ends.
In the second chapter we found that Ames regards the
traditional proofs of God as overthrown, but that he feels
that the concept of God is true in as much as it is useful.
He derives his concept of God from an empirical study of tne
God concept. He discovers that the God concept is a changing
concept, based on the life of a people. He concludes tnat
God is the Spirit of tne world of living beings, taken in
their associated and ideal experience, includes tiie material
world, and signifies tne order of tneir intelligence and conduct.
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In chapter three we found that nines would for trie question of
God*s existence substitute the question of his nature. God,
according to Ames, is infinite, the great cosmic system, of
which no part can stir without influencing the whole: We
in our smallness are related to the whole. God is the largest
whole, the oversoul of tne universe. God is the spirit of
living beings, of humanity, he is their world, idealized and
personified. He is reality idealized; tne order and system
whicii is part of the universe is an element of God. He is
all that is good in reality, its order, intelligence, and
love. Yet even as the world is finite, so God is finite.
As the common will God is concrete. He includes the good in
nature. He is not a myth, but reality, immanent, objective,
experienced, idealized, the concrete universal, the social
process, evolving, personal as well as personified.
In chapter four we considered Ames's idea of the
relationship between God and humanity. According to Ames
the only true mysticism is that of a serious and reverent
attitude toward life. He regards Humanity as not wholly
dependent upon God, and as possessing varying amounts of
freedom. In the friendliness he finds in the world Ames
finds God as friendly.
In chapter five we found that neither the "Social God"
of Ames nor pragmatism could meet our needs.
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CONCLUSION.
Professor H. N. Wieman says that for Ames God is the
symbol of our highest ideals. God is an ideal, or system of
ideals. Ames seems to clearly recognize tnat this is his
position, yet he constantly states his views in a confusing
manner. At this point Professor Wieman gives what seems
to be one of the most serious criticisms that could be given
of any philosophy or philosopher: "This iu very natural,
perhaps necessary, for one who takes this view. For if God
is a sort of glorified Santa Claus
,
serving to symbolize a
spirit, a desired system of habits and institutions, 'social
values' or whatever other name one prefers, it is plain that
He will do this much more effectively if we truly are rather
confused in our thinking and half the time take Him for a
real person. It will help immensely if we can confuse the iss
befuddle ourselves and others, and so give the symbol the
value of a living person"( 90 ). Wieman accuses Ames of
confusing value judgments and ideals with factual judgments.
Of course if we cherish God as an ideal he is a sort of fact,
but the same is true of Santa Claus. Ames reveres the idea
as if it were a person. Ames argues that the God-idea is
teleological , but the teleology of the idea is. not identical
with the teleology of that to which the idea refers. A horse
is teleological, and so is my idea of a norse, but if the two
were identical beggars could ride. My idea of a horse is not
an adequate substitute for a horse. Since all personality is
purposive the supreme Person must be purposive. My idea of
the supreme Person must be purposive. Ames's conclusion that
therefore my idea of the supreme Person must be almost the
same as an actual living supreme Person is a confusion. That
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"both involve purposive action, not static being, does not
make them the same. (91)
In a book notice of Roy Wood Sellars's Religion Coming of
A^e , The Christian Register , Jan. 3, 1929, p. 4, quotes
Professor Sellars as saying that Dewey and Ames are pious,
socially-minded atheists, constructive in that they 3 tress
social values. I would hesitate to call Ames an atheist,
because he does make a laborious effort to formulate a God,
but logically his God has no objective exietence. Tnus in
the sense that Ames does not believe in a supreme personality
he is an atheist. As I have tried to show in numerous comments
within this paper, the God of Ames is only a concept, simply
a subjective mental construct, a product of numan imagination,
for such his God turns out to be when placed in the light of
a critical analysis. The God Ames describes as his can have
existence only witnin human intelligence. His God may best be
summed up as reality idealized and personified.
The chief criticism I have to make of Ames's thought
and concept of God is that they are metaphysically superficial.
He gives no adequate or satisfying explanation of tne universe.
He seems studiously to avoid such questions, but men and
women have always desired to know tne wlr and tne how back
of it all. Because Ames gives us no help in ansv/ering these
questions it would seem that his philosophy cannot long
satisfy thinking people.
•
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